Convincing State-Builders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia by Bakke, KM et al.
Convincing State-Builders?
Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia1
Kristin M. Bakke
University College London
John O’Loughlin
University of Colorado
Gerard Toal
Virginia Tech
and
Michael D. Ward
Duke University
De facto states, functional on the ground but unrecognized by most states, have long been black boxes for systematic
empirical research. This study investigates de facto states’ internal legitimacy—people’s confidence in the entity itself, the
regime, and institutions. While internal legitimacy is important for any state, it is particularly important for de facto states,
whose lack of external legitimacy has made internal legitimacy integral to their quest for recognition. We propose that
the internal legitimacy of de facto states depends on how convincing they are to their “citizens” as state-builders. Using
original data from a 2010 survey in Abkhazia, we examine this argument based on respondent perceptions of security, wel-
fare, and democracy. Our findings suggest that internal legitimacy is shaped by the key Weberian state-building function
of monopoly of the legitimate use of force, as well as these entities’ ability to fulfill other aspects of the social contract.
We are not a failed state, but we are building a normal
state. Despite the war, we survived and are building a
state despite no help from the outside, in fact, in the
face of opposition from the outside.
—Manana Gurgulia, Director of Apsny Press, the state
press agency of Abkhazia.2
In most separatist conflicts, where nonstate groups
fight for independence or greater autonomy within a
state’s border, the outcome entails no major change to
state boundaries. The separatists are either defeated or
appeased with some form of institutional solution short
of independence, such as decentralized governance or
various autonomy arrangements. Yet in some cases, the
conflict results in the creation of so-called de facto states.
Referred to as breakaway regions by their parent states,
most de facto states aspire to be fully independent states
and express this in formalized declarations of indepen-
dence. While they possess domestic or “internal sover-
eignty,” in that they control and administer most or all of
the territory they claim, most de facto states fail to
acquire international legitimacy as states; rather, they
become unrecognized states, entities denied international
legal sovereignty, sometimes termed “external sover-
eignty,” by the existing community of states. De facto
states, in sum, are transgressive territorial entities that
look and function like states but are not recognized as
such.3 In this article, we use the case of Abkhazia to con-
sider how de facto state-building efforts shape internal
perceptions of legitimacy.
The post-Cold War era has seen a proliferation of de
facto states, most of them born out of violent struggles
with their parent states. The collapse of the Soviet Union
and armed conflicts in Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Moldova were followed by the emergence of a number of
such “statelets”—Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, and Transnistria—but de facto states exist
also in other parts of the world and have been features
on the international scene for decades (think of North-
ern Cyprus and Taiwan). At least 21 de facto states have
been created since World War II (Caspersen and Stans-
field 2010:4).4 More than half of these entities have
ceased to exist as de facto states and either been recap-
tured by their parent state or, in a few cases, received
international recognition as states, but many also endure
1 Authors’ notes: This survey work and fieldwork were supported by the US
National Science Foundation (Grant Number HSD 0827016), with additional
support from the Economic and Social Research Council in the UK (grant
number RES-000-22-4507). We want to thank the Levada Center, Moscow and
Krasnodar, for implementation of the survey, as well as the many officials and
NGO members that we interviewed in Abkhazia. Replication data are available
from the IQSS Dataverse Network.
2 Personal communication, Sokhumi (Sukhum), November 9, 2009.
3 For definitional discussions, see Pegg (1999), Anderson (2010:184–187),
Caspersen and Stansfield (2010:3–4), and Mampilly (2011:25–48).
4 Caspersen and Stansfield’s (2010) list includes Abkhazia, Anjouan,
Biafra, Bougainville, Chechnya, East Timor, Eritrea, Gagauzia, Katanga, Ko-
sovo, Kurdistan-Iraq, Montenegro, Nagorno Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Re-
publika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Taiwan,
Tamil Eelam, and Transnistria.
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for years on end, despite their lack of international recog-
nition. One factor possibly accounting for the endurance
of de facto states concerns how legitimate they are inter-
nally, in the eyes of their inhabitants. Indeed, while inter-
nal legitimacy—people’s confidence and belief in the
entity itself, the ruling regime, and state institutions—is
important for any state, it is particularly important for
unrecognized states, whose lack of external legitimacy has
made claims to internal legitimacy integral to their quest
for recognition (Caspersen 2008). Yet to date, we have
relatively little systematic knowledge of what populations
in de facto states think about these entities and their rul-
ers. This article begins to address this absence by concep-
tualizing what internal legitimacy means, theorizing how
it comes about, and empirically examining its sources.
Using original data from a survey we organized in
Abkhazia in 2010, we systematically explore the condi-
tions that facilitate internal legitimacy in a postwar de
facto state. Our argument focuses on how convincing
these entities are as state-builders, particularly their ability
to provide for their citizens’ material and physical secu-
rity.
Internal Legitimacy
While researchers have long addressed why civil wars and
separatist struggles emerge, we have less systematic knowl-
edge about how postwar societies fare after the fighting
officially ends (Barakat 2005). In many cases, the postwar
era is far from peaceful. Peace settlements are assumed
to bring an end to the war but are sometimes followed by
high levels of criminal violence, civilian victimization, or
political violence among former enemies, even among
former allies (for example, Atlas and Licklider 1999; Aut-
esserre 2009; Boyle 2009). De facto states are a peculiar
and fragile form of postwar societies, given that their sta-
tus remains undecided. While not all de facto states are
born out of violent struggles, most are, as states are gen-
erally reluctant to cede control over territory.5 In the de
facto states in the post-Soviet world, the violent conflicts
from which these entities emerged have not formally
come to an end through peace agreements but rather
military victories followed by ceasefires.6 While Nagorno
Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria so
far have survived as state-like entities in the international
system, Georgia tried to reinstate its control over both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the August 2008 war.
Chechnya, in contrast, had a relatively short life as a de
facto state from 1996 until 1999, when it was recaptured
by Russia (Table 1).
The most typical death for a de facto state is recapture
or reintegration by its parent state, as happened with
Republika Krajina in Croatia in 1995, although they can
also cease to exist as unrecognized entities by gaining rec-
ognition, as in the case of East Timor (de facto state
within Indonesia 1999–2002) and Eritrea (de facto state
within Ethiopia 1991–1993).7 Kosovo represents a con-
tested case of partial recognition, now recognized by
more than 90 UN member states. Abkhazia and South
Ossetia were unilaterally recognized by Russia after the
August 2008 war, with only Nicaragua, Venezuela, and a
few small island states following their lead. For the vast
majority of the international community, they remain
unrecognized de facto states.
Despite their lack of international recognition, de facto
states sometimes endure thanks to the benefits that their
elites reap from positions of power and illicit economies
(King 2001; Lynch 2004), the relative weakness of their
parent states (Kolstø 2006), or external support (Lynch
2004; Kolstø 2006; Stanislawski 2008; Anderson 2010;
Mulaj 2010). De facto states, like states, can also endure
due to internal legitimacy, people’s acceptance and loy-
alty to the ruling authority. Our aim in this article is not
to examine the causal link from internal legitimacy to
endurance, which is an important question in its own
right. Rather, we examine an important foundational
question: What are the local perceptual factors that shape
internal legitimacy in de facto states? While researchers
have begun to measure internal legitimacy in de facto
states (Berg 2012; Berg and M€older 2012), there is need
for conceptual debate about what internal legitimacy
means, as well as theoretical thought about the percep-
tual variables shaping it.
Conceptually, we think of legitimate political authority
as one that fosters, among its subjects, an obligation to
obey or comply with its rules, predominantly through
consent. Lake argues that “Obligation arises from the
collective’s belief in rightful rule” (2010:31). Empirically,
we capture legitimacy by examining “the ruled’s” percep-
tions: their belief in and sense of loyalty to “the ruler.”
We treat internal legitimacy as a concept that has distinc-
tive and discrete dimensions: state legitimacy, regime legiti-
macy, and institutional legitimacy.
State legitimacy means that the population within a
state accepts the state’s myths and rules of the game
(Migdal 1988:32–33). Indeed, Migdal argues that key to
any state’s survival is that citizens do not question its
presence; that there is a “shared sense that the state is as
TABLE 1. Post-Soviet de facto States Born Out of Violent Struggles
Separatist
Group(s) Parent State
Violent
Conflict Begins
Ceasefire/Birth of
de facto State De facto State Endurance
Armenians/
Karabakhis
USSR/
Azerbaijan
1988 1994 Nagorno Karabakh Still existing
Dniester Slavs Moldova 1990 1992 Transnistria Still existing
Chechens Russian
Federation
1994 1996 Chechen Republic
of Ichkeria
Recaptured by Russia in 1999
Ossetians Georgia 1991 1992 South Ossetia Both still existing but separation
challenged in 2008 war with GeorgiaAbkhaz Georgia 1992 1993 Abkhazia
5 Entities with de facto state authority are not necessarily born out of sepa-
ratist struggles (Mampilly 2011:50–58), but many are.
6 A ceasefire is a settlement wherein the warring parties agree to lay down
their weapons; in a peace agreement, the warring parties agree also on steps
toward a political solution.
7 On why the international community recognizes only some states, see
Seymour (2012).
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natural as the rivers and the mountains” (2001:168).
Thus, state legitimacy is about believing in the state and
its right to exist; it is about the population’s adherence
to the foundational myth of a political entity as a state.
The greater the unquestioned naturalization of a political
order as a state, the greater its state legitimacy. In the
case of de facto states, we can, empirically, think of state
legitimacy as people’s belief in the entity’s existence as
independent from its parent state—an acceptance of its
foundational myth.8 Regime legitimacy is not about the
state per se but about the state’s regime; it is about trust-
ing the people in power. One can imagine that despite
believing in a state’s right to exist, you might not approve
of the people in power, thus scoring high on state legiti-
macy but low in regime legitimacy. Indeed, this is a com-
mon condition in the United States, where “loving the
country but hating the government” is the preferred posi-
tion of many so-called Tea Party patriots. Finally, while
regime legitimacy is about people’s belief in the people
in power, such as the president and parliament, one can
also think of legitimacy as people’s perceptions of state
institutions in themselves, such as the police or judiciary
(Norris 1999:221–22; Seligson 2002). We refer to this as
institutional legitimacy. In sum, our disaggregation of
legitimacy distinguishes between state myths, people in
power, and functional bureaucracy.
Sources of Internal Legitimacy: De facto States as
Convincing State-Builders
We begin with the contention that internal legitimacy is a
result of how convincing de facto states are as state-build-
ers. Legitimate authority rests with an implicit (and often
mythologized) social contract between ruler and ruled:
The ruler provides benefits, most importantly social
order, to the ruled, and the ruled, in turn, accept the
ruler’s right to rule (see Moore 1978:20–25). That is, peo-
ple’s perceptions of how good de facto states are at doing
the things that states do will shape their belief in the
entity’s right to exist as an independent entity, their
acceptance of its regime, and their trust in its political
institutions.9 Armed groups sometimes engage in wartime
governance activities, such as establishing territorial con-
trol, protecting civilians, or providing public goods (for
example, McColl 1969; Wickham-Crowley 1987; Wood
2003; Kasfir 2005; Mampilly 2011). Besides providing
physical protection, providing public goods such as
schools and healthcare can be critical for insurgents’ abil-
ity to enforce their legitimacy and reduce the chances
that the civilian population turns against them. Building
on these insights, we propose that internal legitimacy in
de facto states born out of violent struggles depends on
whether they are able to provide their inhabitants with
democratic participation, economic goods, and security.
Indeed, given the importance of security in the social
contract between ruler and ruled (Lake 2010), as well as
the centrality of the monopoly on the legitimate use of
force to what it means to be a state (Weber 1958), an
ability to ensure their citizens’ security, both from exter-
nal enemies and domestic instability, is key for de facto
states’ internal legitimacy. An important prior, but sepa-
rate, research question is why some de facto states (or
insurgents or states) are better state-builders than others
(Mampilly 2011), which in the context of Abkhazia can-
not be seen in isolation from Russia’s external support,
both financially and militarily (Kolossov and O’Loughlin
2011). Here, our focus is on how the population’s per-
ceptions of state-building efforts shape their view of the
state, the regime, and institutions.
Let us first turn to democracy. Democracy, in its ideal-
istic normative form, as a variable shaping legitimacy is
consistent with the Weberian notion of rational-legal
legitimacy, where legitimacy comes from public processes
that create accountability (Weber 1978). We can also
think of democracy as a public good that the ruling
authority grants the citizens. Research has found demo-
cratic practices to boost people’s confidence in regimes
and political institutions (Norris 1999). It is reasonable to
expect people’s perceptions of functioning democratic
procedures to be a particularly important source for
internal legitimacy in states and state-like entities emerg-
ing out of violent conflict and authoritarian settings
(Mishler and Rose 2001), as in the post-Soviet de facto
states. Indeed, while de facto states often make claims for
international recognition based on the principle of self-
determination, some, including Abkhazia, also claim that
they deserve to become sovereign states because they
have proven that they are viable democracies (Caspersen
2008); while they may not have external legitimacy, they
maintain that they have, based on their democratic cre-
dentials, internal legitimacy. Thus, we expect people’s
perceptions of functioning democratic practices to boost
state, regime, and institutional legitimacy.
Internal legitimacy can also rest with states and politi-
cal leaders’ ability to provide citizens with material secu-
rity and economic public goods, such as employment and
welfare (Scott 1972; Moore 1978; Gilley 2006; OECD
2010). Rebels sometimes go to great lengths to provide
public goods in the territories they control (Mampilly
2011), with consequences for their ability to rule (Wick-
ham-Crowley 1987). We expect the same to hold for de
facto states. Schlichte argues that the ability to organize
and finance public services is important for the legitimacy
of armed groups that have conquered an area in the
sense that people see that “the new power is not only
able to kill and to destroy but to build and invest as well”
(2009:96). One would imagine concerns about economic
public goods provision to be particularly important for
people living in de facto states if they perceive that they
are worse off in comparison with the parent state.
We emphasize that an important source for internal
legitimacy is security for a state or de facto state’s inhabit-
ants. Indeed, if a de facto state is characterized by vio-
lence and insecurity, internal legitimacy is likely to suffer
both directly and indirectly (see OECD 2010; Bakke
2011). Directly, de facto states unable to provide for their
citizens’ security (and their possessions and property)
may be less likely to be perceived as legitimate than
peaceful ones (see Schlichte 2009), as providing security
is key to what it means to be a state. Indeed, in Tilly’s
(1985) classic formulation, part of what turns war-making
into state-making is a state’s ability to protect its support-
ers. In the context of “guerrilla governments” in Latin
America, Wickham-Crowley (1987:478) has argued that
armed groups establish authority by fulfilling the classic
functions associated with government, thus forming a
social contract with the population. Similarly, providing
8 In separatist struggles, the goal can be the creation of an independent
state, but it can also be irredentist, in the sense that the goal is unification
with a different state than the parent state.
9 There is a mutually reinforcing relationship here, in the sense that legit-
imacy, in turn, aids state-building efforts (Lake 2010). For example, it is easier
for a state to collect taxes (to fund public goods) if it is seen as legitimate.
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people with social order—protection from internal and
external dangers—is particularly important to establishing
a sense of legitimate authority in a postwar society (Lake
2010). In the context of de facto states, not only do the
authorities have to convince the population that they can
do more than fight the parent state; they have to also
convince the population that they can provide for their
security just as well, or even better, than the parent state.
Indirectly, continued violence in a postwar society may
jeopardize public goods provision, in turn diminishing
internal legitimacy. If the postwar era is characterized by
empowered warlords, mafias, violence, crime, or corrup-
tion, public goods provision may suffer as tax revenues
decline, and rulers may spend resources on attracting
support from loyal “strongmen” rather than providing
public goods (Reno 2002). Moreover, postwar societies
face material destruction and disrupted or diminished
economic growth (for example, Collier 2009; Kang and
Meernik 2009). These problems are likely to be aggra-
vated by low foreign investments. For investors, de facto
states may represent a legal vacuum and be undesirable
places to invest (although in the case of Abkhazia, there
are active efforts at trying to attract FDI by providing
information and assistance). As such, postwar violence in
de facto states may be damaging for economic growth
and, in turn, public goods provision. In terms of postwar
violence’s effect on democracy, without a clear break
from the violent past (in the form of demilitarization, for
example), elections are likely to be dominated by ques-
tions related to security, which can jeopardize the transi-
tion to democracy (Lyons 2004). Finally, it is also
reasonable to expect that to the degree any collective
identity has been formed during the violent conflict, the
sense of collectiveness may deteriorate in the postwar
society if it is characterized by violence.
Indeed, an alternative source for internal legitimacy
might be de facto states’ nation-building (rather than
state-building) efforts. Both states and de facto states may
gain internal legitimacy by fostering a collective identity.
Migdal (2001) notes that even states that are remarkably
insufficient at providing their citizens with material well-
being tend to survive, suggesting that their legitimacy has
other sources, such as ceremonies and public rituals
aimed at forging unity. In rebel-held territories, insurgent
groups have mimicked the symbols associated with
nation-states—such as flags, currency, and national
anthems—as a means to foster consent and cohesiveness
(Mampilly 2011:56–58). In the case of postwar and de
facto states, such nation-building efforts may be highlight-
ing the population’s shared war experiences and com-
mon enemy to create collective solidarity (Lynch 2004;
Kolstø 2006; OECD 2010; Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011).
While a sense of collective solidarity is likely to shape all
forms of internal legitimacy, we anticipate that it would
be particularly important for state legitimacy.
To empirically examine the determinants for internal
legitimacy in de facto states, we draw upon a 2010 survey
we directed in Abkhazia. Abkhazia is a de facto state
whose population, as in Chechnya, Transnistria, South
Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh, has seen fighting in the
name of independent statehood both during and after
the war of 1992–1993, as well as criminal violence during
and after the war, making it a good case for exploring
whether individual variation in experiences of security
and safety in the postwar era affects the entity’s legiti-
macy. Thus, the research design is a large-n analysis of
micro-level variation within one de facto state. Before dis-
cussing survey design and variables, we introduce the case
of Abkhazia.
War and Postwar Developments in Abkhazia
An autonomous republic within Georgia, Abkhazia had,
per the 1989 Soviet census, a population of 525,000,
including Georgians (45.7%), Russians (14.3%), Arme-
nians (14.6%), and Abkhaz (17.8%). A separatist war
broke out in August 1992, spurred by tides of nationalism
among both Georgians and Abkhaz. The titular Abkhaz
population, despite their minority status, had in late
Soviet times dominated positions of political power within
the region. This Abkhaz dominance did not sit well with
the ethnic Georgian majority or the growing nationalist
movement in Tbilisi, particularly not in an era of height-
ened nationalist discourse in the waning days of the
Soviet Union. While ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia feared
that the non-Georgian–Abkhaz population would prevent
Georgian independence from the USSR, the ethnic Abk-
haz population was worried that they would end up in a
disadvantaged position and also lose their language and
culture in an independent Georgia. Hence, they called
for Abkhazia to become a separate republic within the
still-existing USSR. From 1988 to 1989, tensions escalated,
and in August 1992, the troops of then-independent
Georgia moved into Abkhazia. By September 1993,
Abkhaz forces with external help had managed to take
control, and in June 1994, the Abkhaz and Georgian
authorities solidified this Abkhaz battlefield victory by
agreeing to the deployment of a UN Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG) as well as 3,000 Russian peacekeep-
ers (Z€urcher 2007:120–132). All ethnic groups suffered
displacement during the Georgian–Abkhaz war, but
200,000–240,000 ethnic Georgians found themselves in
protracted displacement beyond Abkhazia after the war
(Toal and Grono 2011:656).
The ceasefire more or less held until 2008, although it
was on several occasions challenged by border skirmishes
and clashes between armed forces and civilians or para-
military groups. In August 2008, Georgian forces attacked
the other unrecognized state within its borders, South
Ossetia, leading to a short-lived but deadly interstate con-
flict as Russian forces sided with South Ossetia to counter
Georgian troops. Abkhaz forces, with the help of Russian
air power, used the opportunity to establish control over
the upper Kodor(i) Valley. The Abkhaz authorities con-
sider the upper Kodor(i) Valley to be part of Abkhazia,
based on the old Soviet boundaries, but it had been con-
trolled by Georgians since the 1992–1993 war. Since the
2008 war, some 4,000–5,000 Russian security personnel
have been stationed along the border with Georgia and
in a new base, while the UNOMIG forces have withdrawn
(ICG 2010:3).
As in other de facto states, the return of displaced/ref-
ugee populations to their prewar homes has spurred vio-
lent confrontations. In 1997–1998, the spontaneous
return of thousands of Georgians led to border clashes in
Gal(i) district in the south,10 which prior to the war was a
Georgian-dominated region (96% of the population there
were largely Mingrelian-speaking, ethnic Georgians),
resulting in the expulsion of 30,000–40,000 of the retur-
nees (ICG 2006:11). The clashes were between the Ab-
khaz militia and a Georgian paramilitary group, the
10 The Russian/Abkhaz spelling is Gal, and the Georgian spelling is Gali.
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White Legion (Lynch 2004:29–30), but also directed at
civilians (Walker 1998:12). While the Abkhaz constituted
only a minority in Abkhazia prior to the war, O’Loughlin,
Kolossov and O’Tuathail (2011) estimate that 42.5% of
the region’s postwar population is Abkhaz, and the offi-
cials in the entity’s government are predominantly ethnic
Abkhaz.11 Despite inter-ethnic clashes, a number of
Georgians had returned to Gal(i) district a decade after
the conflict came to an end (Lynch 2004:52–54; Interna-
tional Crisis Group 2006:9–10). Today, the population in
the still Georgian-dominated region is about 44,000,
although many Georgians remain displaced. Human
Rights Watch (2011) report widespread feelings of insecu-
rity among Georgians in Gal(i). Indeed, a common state-
ment in interviews in Gal(i) with the second and third
authors in November 2009 is that this population feels
like a “double minority” in both Abkhazia and in Geor-
gia, whose government has accused the returnees of dis-
loyalty. As we discuss below, this sense of insecurity
among the Georgian population in Gal(i) has implica-
tions for the survey responses (76% of the Georgians sur-
veyed live in Gal(i)).
While the Abkhaz elite has been united in its separatist
quest, Abkhazia has suffered from internal power strug-
gles. The independence movement’s leader and first presi-
dent, Vladislav Ardzinba, was in the early 2000s
increasingly challenged by the war veterans group Amtsak-
hara, which in 2003 helped bring down the government
(Khashig 2003). In 2004, Amtsakhara’s political secretary
was assassinated, encouraging the opposition to call for
the government’s resignation (Anjaparidze 2004). The
October elections the same year were disputed and fol-
lowed by mass protests (Khashig 2004). A deal behind the
scenes led to the opposition leader Sergei Bagapsh eventu-
ally emerging as the elected victor (he died in May 2011).
Recent years have seen assassinations and assassination
attempts of high-profile political figures (ICG 2010:12),
sometimes tied to criminal violence. Especially in Gal(i),
until 2008, the activities of Abkhaz and Georgian criminal
networks were easily conducted across the porous border.
In 2009, it was reported that the Russian Interior Ministry
had pledged support to combat crime and corruption in
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.12 In February 2012,
Abkhazia’s current president, Aleksandr Ankvab, who
since coming to power in contested elections in fall 2011
eagerly has tried to clamp down on corruption, survived
an assassination attempt, the sixth attempt on his life in
the last decade.13 Despite this violence, parliamentary
and presidential elections have been held consistently ( O
Beachain 2012). We would expect that this kind of tur-
moil to engender feelings of insecurity that are likely to
shape internal legitimacy.
Research Design
The 2010 public opinion survey that allows us to explore
internal legitimacy in Abkhazia was designed by John
O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal
(O’Loughlin et al. 2011). It was carried out by the Levada
Center in Moscow, employing both Russian and local
interviewers. O’Loughlin et al. established, through field-
work, that it would be particularly important to use local
Mingrelian- and Georgian-speaking interviewers in the
south of Abkhazia, especially in Gal(i), where the popula-
tion might be hesitant to answer sensitive questions asked
by outsiders (Levada used local Georgian school teachers
accompanied by their surveyors). The sample (N = 1000)
reflects the Abkhaz government’s estimates of ethnic dis-
tribution—a distribution disputed by the Georgian gov-
ernment. The survey sample includes 42.5% Abkhaz,
18.5% Armenian, 12.5% Georgians, 10.4% Russian, 7.4%
Mingrelian, 4.3% Georgian/Mingrelian, and 4.4% of
other, mixed, or unknown ethnic backgrounds. The offi-
cial Georgian position is that the Mingrelian population is
Georgian, but the local population uses the categories
Mingrelian and Georgian/Mingrelian and could choose
either category as their nationality in the survey; in the
empirical analysis, we include all three categories in the
dummy variable for ethnic Georgians. The primary sam-
pling units (PSUs) were the 170 precincts used in
Abkhazia’s 2009 presidential election. The rural part of
Gali(i) was not divided into electoral districts; hence, vil-
lages were used as PSUs. Of the PSUs, a random sample
of 84 was selected, with 11-12 interviews in each, based on
a random route method. The overall response rate was
67%.
Operationalization and Description of Variables
The survey included more than 140 questions. For many
questions, the Georgian respondents chose the “difficult
to say/don’t know” option; this strategy is possibly a way
out of responding to politically sensitive and difficult
questions. As we discuss below, to avoid that these respon-
dents are systematically excluded from the analysis by
treating them as missing observations, we use copula
methods to impute these answers (Nelson 2010). That is,
unless otherwise noted, all “difficult to say/don’t know”
answers (shown in the figures) are imputed in the empiri-
cal analysis. Summary statistics for the questions used in
the analysis, including the imputed responses, are in the
Appendix.
To assess state legitimacy, which we conceptualize as
acceptance of the entity itself, we use a question that asks
people what the status of Abkhazia should be. We distin-
guish among, on the one hand, those who say that Abk-
hazia should become part of Russia (about 24%) or
Georgia (about 4%) and, on the other hand, those who
think Abkhazia should “remain an independent state”
(nearly 63%). Our assumption is that those who accept
the foundational myth of Abkhazia as independent see it
as legitimate. As Figure 1 shows, there is variation across
ethnic groups. Nearly half the Georgian respondents
favor that Abkhazia remaining independent, but many
also seem to opt for the choice “difficult to say” to avoid
answering a contentious question. These responses sug-
gest that for many Georgians currently in Abkhazia, the
possibility of reintegration with uncontested Georgia is
unrealistic, and they may have resigned to a pragmatic
acceptance of Abkhazia’s de facto independence.
Unsurprisingly, the majority of the ethnic Abkhaz pop-
ulation thinks that Abkhazia should be independent, and
the majority of the respondents in favor of this option
(54%) identify as ethnic Abkhaz. We also use a second
11 The 2011 census in Abkhazia, which is disputed by the Georgians,
reports that ethnic Abkhaz now makes up 50.7% of the population. See “The
Population of Abkhazia Stands at 240,705,” Apsny Press, December 30, 2011;
available online at http://apsnypress.info/en/news/338.html (accessed July
26, 2012).
12 “Russian Policemen to Cooperate with Abkhazia, S Ossetia Colleagues,”
ITAR-TASS, November 12, 2009.
13 Michael Schwirtz, “President of Abkhazia Survives Assassination
Attempt,” New York Times, February 22, 2012.
Kristin M. Bakke et al. 5
measure for state legitimacy, a question that asks whether
things in Abkhazia are moving in the right or wrong
direction, which captures people’s overall assessment of
the de facto state’s future. The majority responded that
things are moving in the right direction, although again,
there is variation across ethnic groups.14
To assess regime legitimacy, we asked the respondents
whether they trust the ruling regime (the president and
parliament). For institutional legitimacy, we rely on ques-
tions that inquire about people’s trust in more permanent
institutions, specifically the police and judiciary.15 Trust
signals that people have faith in an institution (or person)
and is, therefore, a suitable indicator for the acceptance
—the legitimacy—of the ruler’s right to rule. Figure 2
shows the breakdown by major ethnic groups for two of
these indicators. Note that trust in the president, at the
time Sergei Bagapsh, is very high also among Georgians.
Bagapsh, who was married to an ethnic Georgian, was
generally well liked, and the high trust we observe might
be a personality effect. As for institutional legitimacy, less
than half of the respondents expressed trust in the police
and courts and law. Low trust in the police is not atypical
for the post-Soviet world; our previous work shows that it
is lower in the North Caucasus, where more than 90% of
respondents in a 2005 survey distrusted the police.16
Per the state-building argument, the key independent
variables hypothesized to shape internal legitimacy are
democracy, economic public goods provision, and per-
ceptions of security. The nation-building argument
emphasizes a collective identity based around shared war
experiences and a common enemy.
In terms of democracy, the data reveal a somewhat
hesitantly positive outlook. In response to a question that
asks respondents to assess, among a battery of similarly
phrased questions, how significant a problem is “lack of
democracy,” more than half say it is “not a problem” or
“no big problem.” Honing in on individual experiences,
people were also asked to assess how much influence they
have on political life. Our expectation is that the less
influence people think they have, the less likely they are
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FIG 1. Two Measures for State Legitimacy, Responses by Major Ethnic Groups
14 In this case, we recode the “difficult to say” answer to “moving in the
wrong direction,” as the answer indicates a certain level of doubt about where
Abkhazia is going.
15 For the questions capturing regime and institutional legitimacy, we re-
code the “difficult to say” answers to “no,” as the answer indicates doubt about
trusting the authority in question.
16 The North Caucasus project is available at http://www.colorado.edu/
ibs/waroutcomes (last accessed June 28, 2012).
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to have faith in the entity, the regime, and political insti-
tutions. Nearly 55% state they have little or no influence.
Thus, these questions paint a mixed picture of people’s
perceptions of democracy in Abkhazia. Again, we note
variation across ethnic groups (see O’Loughlin et al.
2011), with the Abkhaz relatively satisfied and the other
groups more leery of the political sector, largely due to
the entity’s ethnocratic nature (Clogg 2008; Trier, Lohm,
and Szakonyi 2011). Indeed, the president is required to
be ethnic Abkhaz and fluent in the Abkhaz language
(Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012). At the time of the survey,
only nine of 35 members of the parliament were of non-
Abkhaz ethnic background.
To assess how the inhabitants in Abkhazia perceive the
provision of economic public goods, we use a question
that asks people how significant a problem lack of eco-
nomic development and unemployment poses, as well as
a question that asks them about the provision of public
health services.17 As in the rest of the post-Soviet world,
economic development is a worry, and almost 80% say
that lack of economic development and unemployment is
a “big problem” or a “rather big problem,” suggesting
that the ruling authority might be failing in this aspect of
the social contract. In terms of public health provision,
the outlook is somewhat better but still skeptical. The sur-
vey also asks the respondents to compare the economic
situation in Abkhazia and its parent state, Georgia. One
would expect that people who perceive the economic sit-
uation to be better in Abkhazia would also think more
highly of the entity’s internal legitimacy. Almost three in
five say the situation seems “better” or “much better” in
Abkhazia than in Georgia. While this comparison ques-
tion is interesting and worth examining, it is potentially
problematic as it is mainly the Georgian population living
in Gal(i) who ever travels to Georgia (Toal and Grono
2011). To assess people’s lived experience of public
goods provision, the survey asks the respondents to rate
their family’s income level. There are differences within
Abkhazia, but overall, about 70% said they “can purchase
all they want” or “all they want apart from durable
goods.” So while many see lack in public goods provision
as a problem, most nonetheless perceive the situation to
be better in Abkhazia than in Georgia, and most appear
to be able to put food on the table.
The survey includes several questions that capture peo-
ple’s feeling of postwar security and safety, in terms of
both criminal and political violence. Key to the ruler’s
promise in the social contract is protection of subjects
and their possessions. When asked about how great of a
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FIG 2. Trust in the President and the Police, Responses by Major Ethnic Groups
17 On economic insecurity and migration in Abkhazia, see Kolossov and
O’Loughlin (2011).
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problem is crime, almost as many saw it as a small or no
problem as a problem. The same goes for the respon-
dents’ assessment of corruption. To assess feelings of
insecurity related to political violence between the groups
that were fighting one another during the war, respon-
dents were asked to assess how significant a problem is
increasing hostility between the various national groups
in Abkhazia (Figure 3). The majority deemed this to be
“no major problem” or “no problem at all.” The picture
was slightly different in Gal(i), which, since the 1992–
1993 war, has been the scene of ethnicized clashes, where
only 29% did not see it as a problem or only a small
problem. People were also asked more directly about
their own experience of discrimination on ethnic or reli-
gious grounds in the last 12 months, and the results show
relatively little insecurity. As for the prospects of renewed
war with Georgia, the majority considered this to be “no
major problem” or “no problem at all,” most likely due to
the presence of Russian peacekeepers since the 2008 war.
Overall, the survey reveals a greater sense of insecurity
when it comes to criminal than political violence.
While our expectation is that individuals’ perceptions
of postwar violence will shape their assessment of the
entity’s internal legitimacy, we also control for experi-
ences of wartime violence. It may be the case that those
who suffered the most during the war are struggling with
its aftermath and have a harder time believing in and
trusting anyone, including those in power. To assess this,
we use a question that asks whether the respondents or
their close relatives witnessed violence during the war;
more than 60% replied that they did.
The nation-building argument emphasizes that a strong
sense of collective solidarity among the citizens of an
unrecognized state is likely to boost the inhabitants’
perception of the entity’s legitimacy. We assess a sense of
collective identity based on a survey question that asks
people how they would name themselves “in the first
place”—as belonging to their people, citizens of Abkhaz-
ia, citizens of Russia, “Soviet man,” representative of one
of the Circassian people, inhabitants of the Caucasus, citi-
zen of Georgia, or other. Our expectation is that people
who identify as citizens of Abkhazia are, based on their
collective identification with the entity, likely to consider
the regime and its institutions as legitimate. Among the
survey respondents, more than 40% identify as Abkhaz
citizens. Most of these are of Abkhaz ethnic background
(52%), while only 19% of the respondents identifying as
Abkhaz citizens are of Georgian or Mingrelian back-
ground.
Key to the rationale for collective identity affecting
internal legitimacy in postwar societies is that shared war
experiences have created a notion of belonging together,
united against a common enemy. To test this, we rely on
a survey question that asks people how they “think now
of the Georgians” (unspecified locationally). Ostensibly,
this collective identity names the wartime out-group. If
people feel negatively about the wartime out-group, they
may be more likely to find the entity legitimate based on
a clear common enemy image. This is an imperfect mea-
sure as not all Georgians were considered wartime ene-
mies; we use it nevertheless, since it is revealing, as is also
the case in other de facto states. We note, though, that
official Abkhazian discourse continues the Soviet ethos of
describing the state as multiethnic and inclusive, so
“political correctness” entails no expression of negative
feelings about Georgians (especially when prompted in
surveys). The majority of respondents have positive feel-
ings toward the Georgians. Most (nearly 70%) of those
who have bad feelings about the Georgians are respon-
dents who identify as ethnic Abkhaz, although the
Abkhaz are split on the question (37% with good feelings
and 35% with bad feelings).
Because of the ethnocratic nature of the state-building
efforts in Abkhazia, we need to capture whether there
are differences across ethnic groups. We control for
whether respondents were Abkhaz, Georgian, or Russian
(leaving the Armenians and the few respondents who
identify as other as the reference group), expecting the
Abkhaz population to find the entity more legitimate
than any other ethnic group. We also expect the Russian
population to view the entity and its regime as legitimate,
given that Russia has formally recognized Abkhazia as a
state.
We also control for gender and year of birth, which
ranges from 1922 to 1992. While we do not have any gen-
der expectations, we anticipate that younger respondents,
who have come of age and been socialized since Abkhazia
gained its de facto status after the 1992–1993 war, are
more likely to find the entity legitimate than older
respondents, socialized in the Soviet context.
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Empirical Models
Our base model for assessing internal legitimacy is based
on micro-level variation, examining the role played by
people’s evaluation of democracy, welfare and material
well-being, and security, as well as collective solidarity,
wartime violence, ethnicity, gender, and year of birth. In
general, the independent variables are coded so that the
higher the score, say on a 1–4 scale, the bigger the perceived prob-
lem (see Appendix 1). We employ three sets of dichoto-
mous variables for assessing internal legitimacy, using
logistic regression. First, to assess state legitimacy, we rely
on a question that indicates whether respondents think
that Abkhazia should be an independent state or become
part of Russia or Georgia, as well as a question that
assesses people’s view on whether Abkhazia is moving in
the right direction (Table 1). Second, for regime legiti-
macy, we assess trust in the president and the parliament
(Table 2). Third, for institutional legitimacy, we assess
trust in the police and trust in the judiciary (Table 3).
We proceed to discuss our main findings, followed by a
brief discussion of robustness and goodness of fit.
To address the large number of Georgian respondents
opting for the “difficult to say/don’t know” answer
options, we chose not to treat them as missing observa-
tions (which would drop them from the analysis, reduc-
ing the N to 440–460 from 1000).18 Indeed, these
answers are not missing but, most likely, the result of
sense of insecurity felt by many Georgians in Abkhazia.
We use copula methods to impute the responses in these
categories. This means that the “difficult to say/don’t
know” category is treated as missing, and copula methods
use all the available data to construct a joint density of all
the variables, transformed to ranks (Hoff 2007). Once
this joint density of the ranks is constructed, it can be
sampled from repeatedly to provide a reasonable estimate
of the information to be imputed. For example, the vari-
able that asks about inter-ethnic hostility has 119 respon-
dents opting for “difficult to say,” but the copula method
assigns these across the other answer categories. As
Table 2 shows, most of the imputed responses end up in
categories 2 and 3. The answer category “refuse to
answer” does not appear to be a similarly popular option
for those reluctant to answer contentious questions, so we
leave this as is, which means that those respondents are
dropped from the analysis.
Findings
We report our findings in Tables 3–5, using odds
ratios.19 Recall that our independent variables are coded
so that a higher score means that the issue identified,
such as lack of economic development, is considered
more severe. With respect to the control variables, we
note that the generational effect revealed in several of
the models goes contrary to our expectation. Youth
(higher birth year) is negatively associated with different
forms of internal legitimacy. We would have expected
people who have grown up and been socialized during
Abkhazia’s de facto state period to be more likely to see
TABLE 2. Original vs. Imputed Answers for Question on Inter-Ethnic Hostility
No Problem at All (1) Not Big Problem (2) Rather Big Problem (3) Very Big Problem (4) Difficult to Say Refuse to Answer
Original 503 171 132 49 119 26
Imputed 514 232 160 68 0 26
TABLE 3. State Legitimacy
Belief in Abkhazia’s
Status
as Independent
Abkhazia Moving
in the Right Direction
Model 1 (Logistic) Model 2 (Logistic)
Democracy
Democracy problems 1.00 (0.10) 0.79 (0.09)**
Influence problems 0.88 (0.08) 0.64 (0.07)***
Welfare provision and
well-being
Economic
development
problems
1.01 (0.10) 0.73 (0.10)**
Public health
provision
problems
1.19 (0.12)* 1.14 (0.15)
Abkhazia–Georgia
comparison:
Abkhazia worse off
economically
1.15 (0.10) 0.92 (0.09)
Material situation
difficult
0.74 (0.08)*** 0.71 (0.10)**
Security and safety
Crime problems 1.02 (0.11) 1.02 (0.12)
Corruption
problems
0.71 (0.07)*** 0.83 (0.09)*
Hostility problems 1.03 (0.11) 0.81 (0.10)*
Harassment
problems
0.95 (0.11) 0.94 (0.12)
New war prospects 0.94 (0.11) 0.79 (0.10)*
Collective solidarity
Abkhaz identity 1.85 (0.31)*** 1.49 (0.29)**
Negative toward
Georgians
1.25 (0.09)*** 0.98 (0.09)
Wartime violence
Witnessed violence 0.99 (0.17) 1.09 (0.22)
Abkhaz 3.69 (0.73)*** 1.35 (0.34)
Georgian 4.13 (1.12)*** 0.48 (0.15)**
Russian 2.00 (0.52)*** 0.91 (0.29)
Year of birth 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.01)*
Gender 0.79 (0.13) 1.24 (0.24)
N 889 887
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.22
Notes. Estimations are done in Stata 10. The table provides odds ratios. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. All “refuse to answer” observa-
tions are dropped from the analysis.
*Indicates statistical significance at 0.10.
**Indicates statistical significance at 0.05.
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01.
18 We also did the empirical analysis without imputing the “difficult to
say” options, and our results are generally consistent with what we find when
imputing (rather than dropping) these observations.
19 Odds ratios higher than one indicate a positive relationship, while odds
ratios lower than one indicate a negative relationship.
Kristin M. Bakke et al. 9
the regime as legitimate. We briefly note the gender
effect revealed in Model 6: Women are more likely than
men to trust the judiciary.
Democracy
People’s perception of influence and democratic prac-
tices are important determinants for internal legitimacy.
Indeed, people’s worries about the hands-on matter of
whether they can influence what is happening in Abkhaz-
ia shape all forms of internal legitimacy. The influence
variable assesses people’s perceptions of their ability to
shape what is going on in Abkhazia on a four-point scale,
where a higher number indicates that the respondents
find that they have less influence. Respondents who
report having little influence are likely to be skeptical
when asked whether things are moving in the right direc-
tion (Model 2). Similarly, people’s perceptions of lack of
influence have a strong effect on both regime (Models 3
and 4) and institutional legitimacy (Models 5 and 6). The
survey question that asked people more generally about
whether they think the absence of democracy is a prob-
lem for Abkhazia reveals that, the bigger the perception
of a democratic deficit, the less likely they are to be posi-
tive about the future (Model 2) or trust the president
(Model 4). This more general question about democratic
problems does not seem to shape people’s perceptions of
institutional legitimacy, and our analysis shows that inter-
nal legitimacy, in all its forms, is more strongly affected
by people’s direct concerns about their own ability to
influence the polity.
Welfare Provision
Key to the ruler’s obligation in the social contract is pro-
viding material security. We find that people’s assessment
of their family’s material well-being is important for state
legitimacy but not for other forms of legitimacy. The
worse off people are, the less likely they are either to
favor Abkhazia as independent (Model 1) or believe that
it is moving in the right direction (Model 2). These find-
ings are consistent with expectations in the literature, but
people’s assessment of their material situation does not
have a similar negative effect on regime and institutional
legitimacy.
Economic public goods such as development and
employment appear to shape both state and regime legiti-
macy. The larger the problem that lack of economic
development and unemployment appears to respondents,
the less likely they are to believe that Abkhazia is moving
in the right direction (Model 2) and trust the parliament
(Model 4). Institutional legitimacy is not shaped by eco-
nomic public goods provisions, but we find that the provi-
sion of quality public health services does affect both
trust in the judiciary (Model 6) and the president (Model
3). As far as state legitimacy goes, perceptions of prob-
lems associated with provision of public health services
have, unexpectedly, a weakly positive effect on people’s
views on Abkhazia’s status (Model 1, significant at the 0.1
level), but do not affect their view of the future. The posi-
tive effect we observe in Model 1, which contrasts with
the negative effect observed in Models 3 and 6, could be
a result of people assessing that problems of public good
provision, such as health services, might be resolved if
Abkhazia were to be independent. We note that this find-
ing does not hold up in the alternative model specifica-
tions discussed below.
We do not find support for the idea that an unfavorable
Abkhazia–Georgia comparison shapes people’s percep-
tions of internal legitimacy. We had expected people who
assess the economic situation in Abkhazia to be worse
(almost 12%) or much worse (almost 9%) than in Geor-
gia to be less likely to see Abkhazia, its regime, and its
state institutions as legitimate. We speculate that this
non-finding might be driven by the Georgians in the sam-
ple, most of whom live in Gal(i) district and who are
likely to see anywhere as better than Gal(i).20 To examine
this speculation, we dropped the respondents identifying
as Georgians from the sample. Surprisingly, we found
that by doing so, an unfavorable comparison boosted
belief in Abkhazia’s independence, possibly because peo-
ple believe it is the entity’s undefined status that causes a
discrepancy, but the analysis otherwise yielded similar
non-findings for the variable.
TABLE 4. Regime Legitimacy: Trust in the President and Parliament
Trust in President Trust in Parliament
Model 3 (Logistic) Model 4 (Logistic)
Democracy
Democracy problems 0.82 (0.12) 0.79 (0.08)**
Influence problems 0.55 (0.09)*** 0.68 (0.07)***
Welfare provision and
well-being
Economic
development problems
1.17 (0.21) 0.78 (0.10)**
Public health
provision problems
0.69 (0.12)** 0.92 (0.10)
Abkhazia–Georgia
comparison:
Abkhazia worse
off economically
0.90 (0.11) 0.93 (0.08)
Material situation difficult 1.07 (0.19) 0.95 (0.11)
Security and safety
Crime problems 1.10 (0.16) 1.09 (0.11)
Corruption problems 0.64 (0.10)*** 0.69 (0.07)***
Hostility problems 1.13 (0.16) 0.87 (0.09)
Harassment problems 1.08 (0.18) 0.94 (0.11)
New war prospects 0.72 (0.10)** 1.04 (0.12)
Collective solidarity
Abkhaz identity 2.25 (0.55)*** 1.56 (0.26)***
Negative toward
Georgians
1.02 (0.11) 0.87 (0.07)*
Wartime violence
Witnessed violence 1.48 (0.35)* 0.84 (0.15)
Abkhaz 0.85 (0.26) 1.20 (0.25)
Georgian 1.08 (0.46) 0.77 (0.23)
Russian 0.74 (0.28) 1.04 (0.28)
Year of birth 0.98 (0.01)*** 1.00 (0.00)
Gender 1.01 (0.23) 1.27 (0.21)
N 883 879
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.14
Notes. Estimations are done in Stata 10. The table provides odds ratios. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. All “refuse to answer” observa-
tions are dropped from the analysis.
*Indicates statistical significance at 0.10.
**Indicates statistical significance at 0.05.
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01.
20 The survey shows that ethnic Georgians are more pessimistic about the
prospects of improved future living conditions than other ethnic groups.
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Security
Questions about protection from internal and external
dangers get at the core of what it means to be a state;
hence, we would expect that such concerns are strong
drivers for internal legitimacy. In the empirical analysis,
we include several variables that capture perceptions of
insecurity associated with crime, corruption, and more
politically oriented violence.
Our analysis clearly shows that people’s perceptions of
crime and corruption are key determinants for all forms
of internal legitimacy. A consistently negative and signifi-
cant influence of corruption is not surprising, as the sur-
vey reveals much concern about people’s economic
prospects, which is closely tied to corruption. Indeed,
Moore (1978:28) reflects that, “although the moral atti-
tudes toward bribery and the participants vary greatly in
time and space (social as well as geographic), there
appears to be a common core of negative attitudes to it.”
We find less consistent support for concerns about
political violence shaping internal legitimacy. People’s
experiences of harassment have no significant bearing on
any form of internal legitimacy, but as expected, to the
extent that inter-ethnic hostilities are perceived as prob-
lematic, it’s also less likely that respondents believe that
Abkhazia is moving in the right direction (Model 2). As
expected, given that protecting citizens from external
threats is central to what it means to be a functioning
state, we also find that the more people are concerned
about the prospects for a new war with Georgia, the less
likely they are to think that Abkhazia is moving in the
right direction (Model 2) and the less likely they are to
trust the president (Model 3). Given that Russia now
guarantees the external security of Abkhazia (and South
Ossetia), the population now has less reason to fear
renewed war with Georgia, which might explain why this
fear is not shaping all indicators for internal legitimacy
(O’Loughlin et al. 2011).
While we had also expected experience of wartime vio-
lence to negatively shape internal legitimacy, we found
instead that witnessing violence during the 1992–1993
war had a positive effect on trust in the president (Model
3). While this goes against the conventional wisdom in
the conflict resolution literature, it is consistent with a
growing body of research pointing to how experiences of
violence actually may boost social capital, political partici-
pation, and altruistic behavior (for example, Staub 2005;
Blattman 2009).
Nation-Building: Collective Solidarity vs. Ethnic Identities
As expected, based on the nation-building argument, a
civic identity as citizen of Abkhazia is positively correlated
with both state and regime legitimacy. The odds that a
respondent favors an independent Abkhazia (Model 1),
believes that Abkhazia is moving in the right direction
(Model 2), and trusts in both president (Model 3) and
parliament (Model 4) are much higher if a respondent
identifies as a citizen of Abkhazia than if a respondent
holds any other non-ethnic identity (such as identifica-
tion as citizen of Russia, “Soviet man,” representative of
the Circassian people, inhabitant of the Caucasus, or citi-
zen of Georgia). We do not find that a collective civic
identity with the entity itself shapes people’s trust in the
police and judiciary, suggesting that such identity is more
important for state and regime legitimacy than for institu-
tional legitimacy. Indeed, as discussed above, the legiti-
macy of the police and judiciary is driven by concerns
related to state-building, rather than to nation-building.
We also find that our second indicator for collective soli-
darity, which more directly assesses what people think
about the wartime out-group, “the Georgians,” shapes
state legitimacy. The more negatively people feel about
the wartime out-group, the more likely they are to prefer
an independent Abkhazia (Model 1). Contrary to our
expectations, we find that people who feel negatively
toward the Georgians are less likely to trust the parlia-
ment (Model 4). It might be that the contradictory (and
non-) findings on the effect of people’s perceptions of
Georgians is that the variable, as noted above, does not
adequately capture the particularistic dynamics of the
Abkhazian case; importantly, as noted, not all Georgians
were considered wartime enemies.
Our findings also reveal that our control variables for
more exclusive ethnic identities have a strong influence
on state legitimacy, but not for other forms of internal
legitimacy. Identification as ethnic Georgian is negatively
correlated with thinking that Abkhazia is moving in the
right direction (Model 2), and there is a positive correla-
tion between respondents identifying as ethnic Abkhaz
and support for Abkhazia remaining an independent
TABLE 5. Institutional Legitimacy: Trust in State Institutions
Trust in Police Trust in Judiciary
Model 5 (Logistic) Model 6 (Logistic)
Democracy
Democracy problems 0.88 (0.08) 0.94 (0.09)
Influence problems 0.64 (0.06)*** 0.62 (0.06)***
Welfare provision and
well-being
Economic
development problems
0.86 (0.08) 0.97 (0.10)
Public health
provision problems
0.95 (0.09) 0.71 (0.07)***
Abkhazia–Georgia
comparison:
Abkhazia worse
off economically
0.91 (0.07) 0.93 (0.07)
Material situation
difficult
0.98 (0.10) 0.90 (0.10)
Security and safety
Crime problems 0.79 (0.07)*** 0.84 (0.08)*
Corruption problems 0.75 (0.07)*** 0.70 (0.06)***
Hostility problems 0.99 (0.10) 1.00 (0.10)
Harassment problems 1.00 (0.11) 1.01 (0.11)
New war prospects 1.01 (0.11) 1.01 (0.11)
Collective solidarity
Abkhaz identity 1.21 (0.18) 1.28 (0.20)
Negative toward
Georgians
0.95 (0.06) 1.00 (0.07)
Wartime violence
Witnessed violence 0.89 (0.15) 0.84 (0.14)
Abkhaz 0.77 (0.15) 1.04 (0.19)
Georgian 0.66 (0.18) 0.71 (0.20)
Russian 0.70 (0.18) 0.85 (0.22)
Year of birth 0.99 (0.00)** 0.99 (0.00)**
Gender 1.20 (0.18) 1.32 (0.20)*
N 879 875
Pseudo-R2 0.12 0.15
Notes. Estimations are done in Stata 10. The table provides odds ratios. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses. All “refuse to answer” observa-
tions are dropped from the analysis.
*Indicates statistical significance at 0.10.
**Indicates statistical significance at 0.05.
***Indicates statistical significance at 0.01.
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state (Model 1). The ethnic Russian respondents appear
to also favor Abkhazia remaining independent, which is
unsurprising, as many of the Russians who stayed after
1991 are well integrated and doing relatively well eco-
nomically. More surprising is that the model shows a posi-
tive correlation between identification as ethnic Georgian
and support for Abkhazia remaining independent. This is
undoubtedly a controversial finding that requires further
research. Recall from Figure 1 that about half of the
Georgian respondents say that Abkhazia should remain
independent. When we impute the relatively large num-
ber of “difficult to say” responses among the Georgians,
this share increases to 69%. To make sure that the sur-
prising finding is not a result of our imputation strategy,
we also went for the option of simply dropping from the
analysis all respondents going for “difficult to say,” which
still left us with a similar result (but smaller N of 444).
We also divided the Georgian respondents into those
living in Gal(i) and those living elsewhere, but for either
category of Georgians, we find a positive correlation.
There might be a segment of the ethnic Georgian popu-
lation in Abkhazia that are resigned to what appears to
be a powerful and enduring status quo, the de facto inde-
pendence of Abkhazia. Their attitude could thus be
described as a pragmatic status quo choice.
Robustness and Goodness of Fit
To ensure that our findings hold up to alternative model
specifications, we used alternative measures for some of
our independent variables (see Appendix 1). To assess
the existence of a shared wartime enemy group, we ran
alternative models using a question that asked people
whom they blamed for the war. To assess people’s view of
their political influence, we used an alternative measure
that asked them about how they can most likely achieve
the solution to their problems—by going through routine
political channels, via rallies and strikes, or simply stating
they have no routes available. Finally, while the models
reported above controlled for the experience of wartime
violence by assessing whether the respondents or their
close relatives witnessed violence during the 1992–1993
war, as an alternative we used a question that asked peo-
ple whether their home was damaged in the war. While
Model 3 showed that witnessing violence during the
1992–1993 war positively affected trust in the president,
we do not find that experiences of one’s home being
destroyed has a similarly unexpected effect; rather, we
find that wartime destruction of one’s home negatively
shapes trust in the police (Model 5) and judiciary (Model
6). In general, using alternative specifications does not
significantly alter our inferences.
To assess the models’ goodness of fit, we examined
their ability to predict outcomes on the dependent vari-
able within the sample used. As Table 6 shows, there is
still unexplained variance in our models, which have
higher levels of sensitivity than specificity and higher posi-
tive predictive value than negative predictive value. We
also looked at the area under the ROC (receiver operat-
ing characteristic) curve, which is calculated based on a
model’s ability to predict, ranging from 0.5 to 1. A model
that produces events and non-events with equal probabil-
ity will receive a score of 0.5, while a model that correctly
predicts all events and non-events will receive a score of
1. For our models, the score ranges from 0.72 to 0.81,
with the strongest performance for the model examining
Abkhazia’s direction and trust in the president.
Conclusion
In this article, we have empirically tested a set of hypothe-
ses surrounding internal legitimacy in de facto states,
using original 2010 survey data from Abkhazia. We pro-
pose that internal legitimacy is likely to be shaped by the
local population’s perceptions of the de facto state’s
state-building efforts. Indeed, while questions about state-
building are important for any postwar society, they may
be particularly pertinent for de facto states born out of
violent struggles, as these are entities that are trying to
make it on their own in the international system. They
need to convince both their own populations and the
international community that they are, indeed, state-
builders.
Disaggregating the concept of internal legitimacy into
distinct dimensions—looking at people’s confidence and
belief in the polity itself, its ruling regime, and institu-
tions—we are particularly interested in how people’s per-
ceptions of security and safety in the postwar era shape
internal legitimacy. We find that people’s perceptions of
corruption are likely to have negative effects for all
forms of internal legitimacy. Indeed, this is the only vari-
able that shapes every measure for internal legitimacy.
We find only limited evidence of concerns about inter-
nal political violence matters, but the danger of war
recurrence does, indeed, loom in the background. While
there are unique aspects of Abkhazia as a case, the study
suggests that variables likely to shape internal legitimacy
in other contexts (in states and insurgent states) are use-
ful starting points for explaining how legitimate the peo-
ple perceive the entity, its regime, and institutions. The
study reveals that people’s concerns about the provision
of public goods such as democracy, economic develop-
ment, and health services are, in addition to perceptions
of safety and security (or lack thereof), important deter-
minants for internal legitimacy. Thus, our findings sug-
gest that internal legitimacy is not tied only to the key
Weberian state-building function of monopoly of the
legitimate use of force; people are just as concerned
about these entities’ ability to fulfill other aspects of the
social contract.
TABLE 6. In-Sample Predictions
State Legitimacy Regime Legitimacy Institutional Legitimacy
Model 1: Status Model 2: Future Model 3: President Model 4: Parliament Model 5: Police Model 6: Judiciary
Sensitivity 90.75% 94.91% 98.84% 92.01% 65.57% 72.01%
Specificity 29.30% 34.67% 9.43% 33.60% 67.69% 67.36%
Positive predictive value 74.34% 83.40% 88.89% 77.42% 65.41% 69.35%
Negative predictive value 58.39% 66.35% 52.63% 62.96% 67.84% 70.12%
Area under the ROC curve 0.72 0.81 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.75
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These findings speak to bigger questions about state-
building and internal legitimacy, both generally and in
the context of Abkhazia. State-building is rarely, if ever,
simply internal. Abkhazia enjoys considerable financial
support from the Russian Federation in the wake of the
August 2008 war. So also did the government of Georgia,
with pledges of approximately $4.5 billion in aid for
reconstruction, resettlement, and economic recovery after
the war. As such, internal legitimacy cannot be seen in
isolation from external relations. Given that there is still
unexplained variance in the models examined in this
study, a fruitful avenue for future research would compar-
atively probe whether the constituent dimensions of inter-
nal legitimacy have similar sources in recognized states
and de facto states, as well as whether entities and de
facto states in different geopolitical contexts can be ana-
lyzed using similar models (Toal 2013; Toal and
O’Loughlin 2013).
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